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TAHOE'S REQUIEM: THE DEATH OF THE
SCALlAN VIEW OF PROPERTY AND
JUSTICE
Laura S. Underkuffler*
I. INTRODUCfiON
In the two latest "takings" cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court, 1 the string of recent victories by landowners against government seems to have come to an abrupt
halt. Although Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 2 and Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agenc/
were not unmitigated defeats for landowners, the Court's broad
assumption in these cases that an ad hoc, balancing test should
be used to resolve conflicting private and public claims in regulatory takings cases was certainly not what these landowners
sought.
Of course, the idea that an ad hoc, balancing test might be
used in takings cases is not new. For many years this approach
has remained a residual doctrinal category into which cases not
covered by the Court's other, per se rules4 would fall. For in• Professor of Law, Duke University. I would like to thank Greg Alexander, Dan
Cole, Thatcher Freund, Alon Hare!, Carol Rose, and Andr~ van der Walt for their comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the participants in the Second Annual
Constitutional Theory Conference held at New York University, the Fourth Annual
Public Law Conference held at Duke University, the Joint Program on Property Law and
State and Local Government Law held during the 2003 AALS Conference, and workshops at University of Indiana-Indianapolis, Seton Hall University, and the University of
Maine, where prior versions of this paper were presented. This research was supported
by the Eugene T. Bost, Jr. Research Professorship of the Charles A. Cannon Charitable
Trust No.3.
I. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation").
2. 533 u.s. 606 (2001).
3. 535 u.s. 302 (2002).
4. Such per se categories include the permanent physical occupation of land, see,
e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CAlV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), and the loss
of all or substantially all economic value of land, see, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) and Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606.
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stance, in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York
City/ the Court famously stated that a takings analysis involves
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" which weigh "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" and the "character of the governmental action. "6 However, commentators
have rightly sensed that the change wrought by Palazzolo and
Tahoe is more than the simple return to prominence of a traditional idea. In Tahoe, in particular, the direct and emphatic nature of the Court's underscoring of this test signals more. Tahoe
signals, in some fundamental way, a shift in the way that property rights and their protection are viewed.
In this article, I shall explore what this shift is and why it has
so deservedly caught our attention. I will argue that beginning in
the early 1990s, and continuing for a decade thereafter, what I
shall call the "Scalian view" of property and its protection dominated Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. Under this doctrine, of which Justice Scalia was the principal architect, 7 the
idea of property is a concrete, objectively knowable, and immutable legal barrier which marks the boundary between protected
individual interests and the permissible exercise of government
power. If government transgresses this line, the individual is
(almost always) deemed to have been wronged. And compensation is required, as a matter of "justice," under the takings
clause.
With the advent of Palazzolo and Tahoe, this doctrine collapsed. I shall argue that after these cases, no longer will the idea
of property be deemed to mark, with certainty, the point where
protected individual interests end and collective power begins.
No longer will the fact of individual loss-even significant individual loss- necessarily compel the conclusion that a wrong has
occurred. And no longer will justice, in takings disputes, be seen
in only "compensatory" terms.
The sudden collapse of the Scalian view might be seen as an
abrupt or startling turn. In fact, I shall argue that its collapse was
a very predictable product of the Court's prior takings jurisprudence. Neither the Scalian view's idea of property nor its conception of justice could be sustained as the range of potential
takings expanded and acknowledgment of the complexity of
property conflicts grew. The very ideas that form the core of the
5.
6.
7.

438 u.s. 104 (1978).
ld. at 124.
See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
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Scalian view served to doom it, from the outset, as a viable juridical principle.
The collapse of the Scalian view was thus an entirely inevitable outcome. It is also, I shall argue, an entirely welcome outcome, in our effort to reassert sensible notions of takings and
justice.
II. VISIONS OF PROPERTY AND VISIONS OF JUSTICE:
THE RISE OF THE 'SCALlAN VIEW'-AND ITS FALL
In order to understand the changes that Palazzolo and Tahoe represent, we must first sketch the competing visions of
property and justice that shadow takings cases, and how onewhat I shall call the "Scalian view" -came to dominate the Supreme Court's approach to takings in the past decade.
Two philosophically divergent understandings of property
and its protection can be identified in our popular and legal culture. Under the first, or "conservative" vision, the protection of
private property is championed, while under the second, or
"progressive" vision, it is not. Property, as protected by law, isunder the conservative vision-an individual's right to unfettered possession, disposition, and use of land, chattels, or other
corporeal or incorporeal things. It is the conservative project to
protect property rights through legal and political strategies
from collective predation or change. Under the progressive vision, on the other hand, there is nothing wrong with altering
rights in property should collective goals demand it. For the progressive, the legal recognition of the protective force of property
is contingent upon the absence of countervailing social interests.
These characterizations are of course overdrawn to some
degree. Those who adhere to the conservative vision do not
deny, for instance, that previously recognized property rights
must yield when confronted by particularly compelling public interests such as human health or safety. And most progressives
would admit, if pushed, that the idea of property as contingent
and yielding is not, in fact, how they view property in many
situations. For instance, their enthusiasm for the idea that welfare benefits and public employment may be property8 and their

8. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Louderrnill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (public employment) and Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (same);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance payments).
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condemnation of the Poletown case9 were not driven by a philosophical predilection toward the subordination of the individual to collective interests, or a vision of property that reflects
that view. In the main, however, those who adhere to the progressive view have been far more open to the social contingency
of property rights than have their conservative counterparts.
Seen in broad brush strokes, the conservative viewpoint envisions property as individually protective, separative, and autonomy enhancing, while the progressive sees it as contingent, yielding, and dependent on social forces.
The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment has functioned
in many ways as the contemporary constitutional battleground
for these competing visions of property. In most of the past three
decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence, neither vision was
clearly dominant. Conservative majorities often succeeded in asserting their view of property's protective ideal, and protected
property owners' rights against development restrictions of land,
physical invasions of land, restrictions on the occupation or devise of land, and other actions by government. 10 Progressive Justices and their allies, on the other hand, upheld historic preservation laws, endangered species laws, zoning laws, anti-subsidence
laws, and other social measures, even though those laws impaired what would be widely regarded as traditional property
rights. 11
The clear ascendency of a particularly strong form of the
conservative vision in takings cases was marked by the Court's
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council12 in 1992.
This case dealt with a garden-variety, and therefore extremely
important, question: whether ecologically based shoreline regulations which prohibit further development constitute a "taking"
of the landowner's "property." In an opinion that upheld the
landowner's claims, Justice Scalia took the opportunity to entrench-as a philosophical matter, at least-a sweepingly con9. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (upholding the condemnation of a working class neighborhood for the construction of a
General Motors assembly plant).
10. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Loretto v. Telepromter Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419,419 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978).
12. 505 u.s. 1003 (1992).
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servative vision of takings and property. This "Scalian view," as
assumed in Lucas and later cases, involves the following axioms:
• Property is something that is concrete, that we can define
and understand with precision.
• Property protects the individual's interests from collective
powers; that is its essential function.
• The takings clause reflects these truths: it is simply an extension of this function.

As a result of these axioms, in a takings case we must ask
the following questions:
• With what property did "owner x" begin?
• What property does "owner x" have now?
• Should "owner x" be compensated for this loss?
-with this answer being "yes" unless the loss is too trivial;
there are other benefits that "owner x" has reaped; or government has acted to protect (physical) human health or
safety.

This Scallan view has a great strength: it vindicates the idea
of "property as protection" in which all of us, on some level, believe. In this view, property means the protection of our possessions; it means the protection of our "expectations"; it means the
protection of what our efforts, labor, good luck, cunning, and
other circumstances have given us. The Scallan view's attempt to
clearly, cleanly, and boldly vindicate this view has powerful intuitive appeal.
However, behind this structure many problems lurk. Any
legally cognizable conception of property involves a theory of
rights, applied to a particular conceptual space, protected with a
particular stringency, and established at a particular time. 13 Beyond these general statements, however, the particular contours
of "property" are far from obvious. For instance, what do the
"right to use," "rights under state law," or "traditional rights"
really mean? Is an individual's "property" the regulated land,
the legally described parcel, the landowner's holdings, or some

13. See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND
POWER 16-33 (2003).
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other idea? Should all "rights" that are "property" be protected
with equal vigor, or should some be protected more strongly
than others? Are the "rights" that comprise "property" those
that existed at the moment of purchase, the moment of transfer,
or some other moment in history? What of regulations that were
authorized, but not yet issued? What of conditions that existed
but were, at the moment chosen, not yet recognized?
In the face of those questions, the Scalian view of property
and takings remained undaunted. In Lucas/ 4 Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 15 Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation/ 6 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 17 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes/ 8 and
other cases, assumptions were simply made about the nature of
protected individual interests. And once these assumptions were
made, all that remained (as a practical matter) was the application of a compensatory remedy.
In 2001, however, a serious crack in this structure appeared.
In Palazzolo, a landowner was precluded from developing his
parcel in the manner that he wished by a state wetlandspreservation law. 19 The most prominent issue was whether a
landowner could challenge, as a taking, land use regulations that
were already in place when he acquired the property. Most
judges and commentators had rejected such claims on the
ground that owners who took title with knowledge of limitations
in place could not claim injury from lost value. Palazzolo rejected this analysis. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted that the allowance of such claims was required by "the nature of property." 20 Property rights (in this view) are an abstract
ideal, which the takings clause protects from impairment. It
makes no difference whether this claim is asserted by the one ·
who owns the property when the regulation is imposed or by a
later owner. Government cannot escape from a takings claim by
reason of the sale or other transfer of the property. If a wrong
has been done, the takings remedy is available not only to the
person who holds title at that moment, but also to "[f]uture generations. "21

14. 505 U.S. at 1003.
15. 512 u.s. 374 (1994).
16. 524 u.s. 156 (1998).
17. 524 u.s. 498 (1998).
18. 526 u.s. 687 (1999).
19. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
20. ld. at 627.
2 I. Id.
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Up to this point, the case seems to be yet another triumph
for the Scalian view of takings and property. We have a robust,
compensatory takings guarantee for state interference with a
concretely conceived and rigidly defined conception of property.
Other elements in Justice Kennedy's opinion, however, left the
situation oddly open-ended. "The right to improve property, of
course, is subject to the reasonable exercise of state regulatory
authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and landuse restrictions." The ultimate inquiry, he wrote, is whether a
particular state action "is so unreasonable or onerous as to compel compensation." 22 To determine this question the state court
should, on remand, "address ... the merits of petitioner's claim
under Penn Central. " 23
The idea that the "onerousness" of government action
might be dispositive in takings cases is in keeping with the
Scalian view, since it makes what the claimant has lost the focus
of the takings analysis. With the addition of the "reasonableness"
of government action, however, comes a possibly very different
inquiry. For instance, wetlands preservation laws that are "onerous" may nonetheless be "reasonable," if conditions otherwise
demand them. This seemingly broad formulation implies that
other considerations or interests, especially public interests, can
trump a property owner's otherwise legitimate complaint about
a particularly onerous regulation.
Indeed, the Court's endorsement of the Penn Central test
reinforces this suggestion. Penn Central is a famous, pre-Scalianview case that advocated an ad hoc, balancing-of-interests approach to takings questions. 24 Under this approach, it is not the
property owner's interests alone that count in the takings calculation.
Whether Palazzolo's majority opinion changed the assumptions behind takings law was the subject of dueling concurrences
by Justices O'Connor and Scalia. In Justice O'Connor's view,
"investment-backed expectations" -the idea which the Court
had used in recent years to capture the sphere of protected individual interests- are "not talismanic under Penn Central."
Rather, "[e]valuation of the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations ... is [only] one factor" in a more
complex calculation. In her view, "[t]he purposes served [by the
22.
23.
24.

/d. (emphasis added).
/d. at 630.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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government action], as well as the effects produced, ... inform
the takings analysis." 25 Justice Scalia resisted such murkiness and
insisted that the focus remain on the owner's loss of value. Indeed, in his view, to allow government interests to swamp the
property owner's loss "would [be to] ... giv[e] the malefactor
the benefit of its malefaction."26
If Palazzolo suggested a retreat from the Scallan view, the
Court's opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agenc/7 openly declared its abandonment. In Tahoe, the narrow question before the Court was
"whether a moratorium on development imposed during the
process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a
per se taking of property requiring compensation. "28 On its face,
the case seemed to present an ideal opportunity for yet another
application of the Scallan view of takings and property. All development of the petitioners' lakeshore lots was prohibited during various moratoria, depriving petitioners, during those periods, of all reasonable economic value. 29 In addition, the Court
had previously held that temporary takings of all beneficial use
of land were compensable. 30 If the focus remained on the landowners' losses, the complete loss of use for a period of years
seemed to present a strong case for compensation.
Indeed, in their Supreme Court appeal, the landowners
urged an analysis of the case that tracked the Scalian view of
property and takings exactly. They contended that "the mere
enactment of a temporary regulation that ... denies a property
owner all viable economic use of her property gives rise to an
unqualified constitutional obligation to compensate her for the

25.
26.
27.

Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
535 u.s. 302 (2002).
28. Id. at 306.
29. The challenged prohibition on development lasted for at least 32 months, or as
long as 6 years, in the views of various Justices. In the majority's view, the lower courts'
rulings on the moratorium that was in effect from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983,
and the one that was in effect from August 27, 1983 until April 25, 1984, were the only
rulings encompassed within the Supreme Court's limited grant of certiorari. ld. at 306,
313-14. The dissenters argued that the effects of the 1984 Regional Plan (which succeeded these moratoria) were properly before the Court as well. That Plan, which-in
theory-permitted construction, was enjoined by the District Court as violative of Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency's own environmental standards. See id. at 312. In the dissenters' view, the Agency was the "'moving force' behind petitioners' inability to develop
[their) ... land" through 1987./d. at 346-47.
30. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
u.s. 304 (1987).
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value of its use during that period." 31 Because the landowners
had unquestionably borne a loss, in this sense, they argued that
there was "no need to evaluate the landowners' investmentbacked expectations" more deeply, or to consider "the importance of the public interest served by the regulation. " 32
Surprising many observers, the Tahoe majority expressly rejected this invitation and concluded, instead, that the case was
"best analyzed within the Penn Central framework." 33 In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens drew a sharp distinction between
"physical takings" -such as those resulting from a condemnation
proceeding or a physical appropriation-and "regulatory takings," which "prohibit a property owner from making certain
uses of her ... property."3 The Court's jurisprudence "involving
condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic"
and involves, for the most part, "per se rules" of "straightforward application." 35 Regulatory takings jurisprudence, by contrast, "is of more recent vintage and is characterized by 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,' . . . designed to allow 'careful
examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances. "' 36
Although the landowner may clearly lose value as the result of
regulation, that fact is not dispositive of the takings question.
Rather, that loss must be evaluated in the context of the public
program in which it occurs, and of that program's adjustment of
economic burdens and benefits. 37
Quoting liberally from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Palazzolo, Justice Stevens identified the principles set forth in
Penn Central as the "polestar" in determining regulatory takings
claims. 38 "'The Takings Clause requires careful examination and
weighing of all the relevant circumstances .... "' 39 In this calculation, "'interference with ... investment-backed expectations'"that is, the landowner's loss-is only "'one of a number of factors that a court must examine."'40 Only if the regulation effects
"the permanent 'obliteration of the value' of a fee simple estate"
31. Tahoe·Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320.
32. /d.
33. /d. at 321.
34. /d. at 321-22.
35. /d.
36. /d. at 322 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
37. /d. at 324-25.
38. /d. at 327 n.23.
39. /d. (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
40. /d. (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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is the landowner's loss dispositive of the takings question. 41 Since
the moratoria in Tahoe did not reach this extreme, they needed
to be evaluated under the multi-factor, ad hoc, Penn Central test.
In this and almost all cases, "the concepts of 'fairness and justice'
that underlie the Takings Clause will be better served ... by a
Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances. "42
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas, forcefully advocated the Scalian view of takings
and property. There is, the Chief Justice wrote, a "'practical
equivalence' from the landowner's point of view" of the regulations at issue in Tahoe and a physical appropriation. 43 Under
these circumstances, it is not plausible to assume that the regulations "simply 'adjust[] the benefits and burdens of economic
life"' or that the affected landowners receive any tangible benefits from their operation.44 With clear evidence of the landowners' loss, and no clear evidence of their offsetting benefit, the
case for compensation was obvious. He argued that it is this approach- and not that of Penn Central- that is required by the
Court's most recent cases.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist was undoubtedly correct
that his approach is more in keeping with the spirit of Lucas and
other Scalian-view decisions, the majority turned a deaf ear. Indeed, after Tahoe it is apparent that Justice O'Connor has won
the Palazzolo-concurrence battle. If there had been any prior
doubt about the seriousness of the Court's embrace of Penn
Central's ad hoc, balancing, broad-gauged approach in takings
cases, there is no doubt now. No longer will the showing of a
landowner's loss-even a significant loss-be sufficient, of itself,
to compel compensation. After a decade of ascendency, the
Scalian view of property and takings appears to be dead.
Why did this happen? Was this simply the result of a shift in
the philosophical winds, which might, in a few years, blow differently? Or are there deeper reasons-rooted in part, and ironically, in Justice Scalia's own actions-that made this outcome
inevitable?

41. /d. at 330.
42. /d. at 334.
43. /d. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. /d. at 349-50 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1017-18 (1992)).
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III. THE DEATH OF THE SCALlAN VIEW- THREE
REASONS
In this section, I shall argue that the Scalian view of property and takings was doomed for three reasons. Those are: the
Court's opinion in the Lucas case; the extension of takings protection to less tangible legal interests; and the problem of accounting for justice in takings cases.
A. THE LUCAS OPINION

Treating the Court's opinion in Lucas as something that
undermined the Scalian view of property and takings is obviously paradoxical. All would probably agree that if there has
ever been any Justice on the Court who has believed in property
as a concrete instrument for protecting individual interests, it is
Justice Scalia, who authored that opinion. It was undoubtedly
the intention of the Lucas opinion-which established yet another, per se, compensatory takings rule-to shore up this conception of property. Indeed, the Lucas case marks the clear ascendency in Supreme Court jurisprudence of the Scalian view of
takings and property.
In Lucas, however, Justice Scalia's doctrinal ambition in this
regard ran afoul of another impulse: the desire to bring intellectual rigor to the Court's takings jurisprudence. Given the opportunity to address the Court's takings jurisprudence in potentially
historic terms, Justice Scalia apparently could not resist exposing
the intellectual incoherence that riddled the Court's prior opinions.
Let us pause, for a moment, to consider these juxtaposed
goals. The Scalian view of property and takings-in which individuals are strongly protected from government action, by compensation for their economic injuries-depends upon individual
property being something that we can concretely understand. If
we are to afford strong, consistent remedies for government takings of individual property, we must know what that property is
and how it has been impaired by government action. We must
know the "property" with which "owner x" began; we must
know the "property" with which "owner x" is left-with the difference between those values being the measure of just compensation.
Of course, as noted above, the certainty of such "findings"
in the Court's decisions has been far more rhetorical than real.
Indeed, the question of the "property" involved has generally
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received superficial gloss, with the Court moving quickly to the
issue of "taking."45 Consider, for instance, Dolan v. City of Tigard,46 a recent and prominent case. In Dolan, the City of Tigard, Oregon, attempted to condition the approval of a building
permit upon the landowner's compliance with open space, landscaping, and alternative transit requirements. The question before the Court was whether this attempted "exaction" by the
City "constituted an uncomgensated taking of ... property under the Fifth Amendment." At various points, the Court alternately implied that the "property" interest at stake was the right
to exclude (which was sometimes portrayed as absolute in nature
and sometimes not), the right to use, the entire parcel owned, or
the narrow strip of land subject to the challenged regulation. 48
Problems of this sort have led a host of commentators to characterize the Court's portrayals of property in takin~s cases as unexplained, unexplored, and essentially incoherent.
In Lucas, Justice Scalia was apparently determined to avoid
the intellectual murkiness and sleights of hand that so often have
plagued the Court's takings jurisprudence. Indeed, Lucas is replete with references to an intention to confront previous prevarications and to shine the spotlight of incisive intellect into the
dark comers of applied takings doctrine. Incoherent areas that
seemed to have been noticed by everyone but the Court were
suddenly, startlingly, and refreshingly acknowledged. For instance,
in the course of his opinion, Justice Scalia:
• acknowledged that the "conceptual severance" or "denominator" problem in takings cases had not been confronted by the Court. In determining the magnitude of the
property owner's loss, one must know the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured.
However, if (for instance) 90 percent of a tract of land must
be left in its natural state, "it is unclear whether we would
analyze the situation as one in which the owner has [lost all
value in the restricted land] ... , or as one in which the

45. See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Propeny, IX
CANADIAN J .L. & JURIS. 161, 165-66 (1996).
46. 512 u.s. 374 (1994).
47. /d. at 13.
48. See id. at 384--87.
49. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628
(1988); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles (Pan
1), 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1308-16 (1989); Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beerman,
The Social Origins of Property, 6 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 217, 217 (1993); UnderkufflerFreund, supra note 45, at 165-67.

2004]

TAHOE'S REQUIEM

739

owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract
as a whole." 50
• acknowledged that the distinction between "harmpreventing" and "benefit-conferring" regulations (with the
former traditionally held to be a part of a property owner's
"expectations" and the latter not) "is often in the eye of
the beholder" and is "difficult, if not impossible, to discern
on an objective, value-free basis." 51
• acknowledged that the problem in determining what "law"
frames property rights is a difficult one. For instance,
"background principles of nuisance and property law" may
be "manipulable," and "[t]here is no doubt some leeway in
a court's interpretation of what existing state law permits."52

After frankly acknowledging these problems, Justice Scalia
did not attempt to resolve them. Rather, he pushed them aside
as he drove toward his conclusion. On the "conceptual severance" or "denominator" problem, he announced that "we avoid
this difficulty in the present case, since the 'interest in land' that
Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an estate with a rich
tradition of protection at common law." 53 His response to the
"harm-preventing"-"benefit-conferrinf problem was simply to
jettison this as a valid consideration. 5 On the question of what
"law" frames property rights, he vaguely cited state "nuisance
law," state "property law," and "existing rules and understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law" 55 potentially conflicting understandings.
In the end, the question of adequate doctrinal reckoning
with these problems was dwarfed in importance by the acknowledgment of their presence. Once it is admitted that the Emperor
has no clothes, it is far more difficult to take him seriously. The
admission of these problems by the architect of the Scalian enterprise did not immediately doom it. Indeed, as described
above, Lucas marks its clear ascendency. However, even as Lucas struck a bold stroke for the Scalian view, it also undermined
it. Belief in a rigidly protective view of takings law depends on
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
!d. at 1024, 1026.
!d. at 1030, 1032 n.18.
!d. at 1016 n.7.
!d. at 1024-26.
!d. at 1030-31.
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belief in the fiction of property's concreteness. Once Justice
Scalia acknowledged the mythic nature of this image, the door
was opened to more and more explicit challenges.
B. "PROPERTY, PROPERTY EVERYWHERE": THE
EASTERN ENTERPRISES AND PHILLIPS CASES

Perhaps even more fatal to the old, concrete, unexamined
idea of property were the Court's two, ar~uably most protective
takings cases: Eastern Enterprises v. Apte/ 6 and Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation ("IOLTA I"). 7
These cases highlight a truth about takings cases that we
must remember. Takings may involve more than land, chattels,
and other traditional forms of property. Over the years, the right
to vindicate one's "reasonable expectations," 58 the right to "anticipated [commercial] gains," 59 the rights enumerated in an executed contract,60 and the right to "economic advantages" "back[ed]
by law" 61 have been protected by the Court. Indeed, any individual
interest created by law might be something on which the individual sufficiently relies, or to which the individual has sufficient
claim, to be constitutionally cognizable property. It was the
question of the limits, if any, to property's scope that Eastern Enterprises and Phillips explored. Eastern Enterprises confronted a
challenge to the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992
("Coal Act"),62 which stabilized funding for pension plans benefitting the nation's retired miners. Under the Act, coal operators
were assessed premiums to be paid to the plans, based upon
their prior employment of miners now retired. Eastern was assigned the obligation to pay premiums for some 1,000 miners
who had worked for the company before 1966, more than
twenty-five years prior to the Coal Act's adoption. Eastern sued,
claiming that the Act effected a taking of its property without
compensation.
In a series of prior decisions that spanned some thirty years,
the Court had upheld similar social welfare legislation against
56. 524 u.s. 498 (1998).
57. 524 u.s. 156 (1998).
58. E.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104,124-25 (1978).
59. E.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,64-66 (1979).
60. E.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555,602 (1935).
61. E.g., Kaiser Atena v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979); United States v.
Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
62. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994 ed. and Supp. II).
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employers' takings challenges. 63 The Black Lung Benefits Act of
197264 and the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of
198065 required employers to pay disability or pension compensation to former employees or their survivors, despite the companies' refusal to voluntarily undertake that obligation. With respect to those statutes, the Court agreed that the legislatively
imposed liability "constituted a permanent deprivation of assets"
for social welfare purposes, but rejected the notion that it constituted an uncompensated taking prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.66 Analysis in those cases began with recognition of the unquestionably broad power of Congress to fashion economic
legislation. 6 "In the course of regulating commercial and other
human affairs, Congress routinely creates burdens for some that
directly benefit others." 68 As a result, "legislation is not unlawful
solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations." 69
In Eastern Enterprises, however, the Court's plurality opinion took a sharply different tack. In the plurality's view, the Coal
Act suffered from several constitutionally fatal defects. First, the
financial burden that the Act imposed was not proportionate to
the company's prior, voluntary undertaking. The industry's
commitment to the funding of lifetime health benefits for retirees and their family members occurred after Eastern had ceased
its coal mining operations. The plurality observed:
During the years in which Eastern employed miners, retirement and health benefits were far less extensive ... , were unvested, and were fully subject to alteration or termination ....
Although Eastern at one time employed Combined Fund
beneficiaries that it has been assigned ... , the correlation between Eastern and its liability to the Combined Fund is tenuous .... The company's obligations under the Act depend
solely on its roster of employees some 30 to 50 years before ... , without any regard to responsibilities that Eastern
accepted under any benefit plan the company itself adopted. 70

63. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
64. 30 u.s.c. §§ 901-945 (2000).
65. Pub. L. No. 96-364,94 Stat. 1208 (1980).
66. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 222.
67. See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,528 (1998) (plurality opinion).
68. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223.
69. Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 526 (plurality opinion).
70. /d. at 530-31.
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Indeed, the plurality wrote, the Coal Act substantially interfered with Eastern's "property" -its "reasonable investmentbacked expectations. "71 By imposing liability for employees employed many years ago, the Act attached "new legal consequences" to a completed employment relationship. 72 "'Retroactive legislation ... presents problems of unfairness that are more
serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it
can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled
transactions."' 73 The retroactive operation of the Coal Act was
apparent, since it "divest(ed] Eastern of property long after the
compan~ believed its liabilities [to these employees were] ...
settled." 4 Eastern had no notice from "the pattern of the Federal Government's involvement in the coal industry ... that lifetime health benefits might be guaranteed to retirees several decades
later." 75 As a consequence, the Act effected a taking of property
without compensation.
Of course, the Black Lung Benefits Act-which the Court
had previously upheld-a/so charged employers with the health
care costs of employees, whom those employers had employed
decades before. Liability for the disabilities of black lung disease
was no more contemplated or accepted by those coal operators,
than was the pension liability contemplated or accepted by Eastem. The plurality distinguished the Black Lung Benefits Act,
however, on the ground that it "merely imposed 'liability for the
effects of disabilities bred in the past,"' and was "'justified as a
rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor."' 76
"Likewise, Eastern might be responsible for employment-related
health problems of all former employees whether or not the cost
was foreseen at the time of employment ... :m "There is no
doubt that many coal miners sacrificed their health on behalf of
this country's industrial development," and that Congress could
afford them relief as a matter of policy. 78 The problem was that
the solution that the Coal Act embodied imposed "such a dis79
proportionate and severely retroactive burden upon Eastern. "
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

/d. at 532.
/d. (internal quotation marks omitted).
/d. at 533 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992)).
ld. at 534.
/d. at 536.
/d. (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)).
/d.
/d.
/d. (emphasis added).
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The idea that proportionate impact and retroactivity might
be relevant to a due process challenge to legislation is not shocking. Even notice and consent might conceivably be relevant as
defenses to a charge that particular legislation violates particular
individuals' due process rights. By framing this as a takings issue,
however, the plurality opinion extends citizens' rights to a potentially unimaginable degree. The "property interest" that the
Court protected in this case was not Eastern's ability to retain its
money; monetary liabilities to government for the ends of social
welfare are ubiquitous, through taxation and other schemes.
Rather, the "property interest" that Eastern was held to have is
something far more: it is the right to be free of social welfare legislation that upsets expectations, affects one disproportionately,
or is imposed without consent.
The potential reach of this holding is awe-inspiring. What
piece of legislation does not upset expectations, affect some person disproportionately, or cause financial loss without consent?
Whether one considers tax legislation, agricultural regulations,
import-export duties, consumer product safety legislation, banking regulations, welfare programs, school funding programs, or a
myriad of other government acts, it is obvious that the hundreds
or thousands of these enacted every year upset expectations, impose liability on the basis of past relationships and actions, and
disproportionately benefit some to the detriment of others. And
never has the constitutionality of such laws hinged upon notice
or consent. Do all citizens affected by such laws now have
"property interests," protected by "takings" law? What, indeed,
is the reach of the Eastern Enterprises rationale?
The Justices of the Court were not unaware of the problem
that the plurality's opinion created. Justice Kennedy, concurring
in the judgment and dissenting in part, strenuously argued that
the Act "must be invalidated as contrary to essential due rorocess
principles," and not as a violation of the takings clause. 0 "The
plurality opinion," he wrote, "would throw one of the most difficult and litigated areas of the law into confusion, subjecting
States
and
municipalities81 to the potential of new and unforseen
.
.
c1arms m vast amounts." "Property" for takings purposes must
be understood more specifically and traditionally, he argued,
"lest all government action be subjected to examination [as tak-

80.
8 I.

/d. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
!d. at 542.
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ings] ... , with the attendant potential for money damages." 82
"The liability imposed on Eastern no doubt will reduce its net
worth and its total value, but this can be said of any law which
has an adverse economic effect. " 83 Neither freedom from such
impacts nor freedom from the laws that create them can be
"property" that the takings clause protects. We cannot expand
the scope of regulatory takings to include broad inquiries into
what are essentially "normative considerations about the wisdom of government. " 84
Similar concerns were expressed by Justice Breyer's dissent,
which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. "The 'private property' upon which the [Takings] Clause traditionally has
focused," he wrote, "is a specific interest in physical or intellectual property." This case involves only "an ordinary liabili\Y to
pay money, not to the Government, but to third parties. "8 "If
the Clause applies when the government simply orders A to pay
B, why does it not apply ... [to any] tax?" 8 And why would it
not apply "to some or to all statutes and rules that 'routinely
creat(e] burdens for some that ... benefit others?'" 87
If Eastern Enterprises signaled a rush toward the finding of
"property everywhere," Phillips ("JOLTA I") confirmed it. Phillips involved a challenge to Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust
Account (IOLTA) program, which was virtually identical to
programs enacted in 48 other States and the District of Columbia. Under this law, an attorney who received client funds was
required to place them in a separate, interest-bearing, federally
authorized ("IOLTA") bank account, upon determining that the
funds '"could not reasonably be expected to earn interest for the
client or [that] the interest which might be earned . . . is not
likely to be sufficient to offset the cost of establishing and maintaining'" a private, interest-bearing, non-IOLTA account. 88 The
interest that the IOLTA account generated was then paid to the
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, which financed legal
services for low-income persons.

82. /d. at 543.
83. /d.
84. /d. at 545.
85. /d. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86. /d. at 556.
87. /d. (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223
(1986)).
88. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 162 (1998) (quoting
Texas IOLTA Rule 6).
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This law was challenged by depositors of client funds, who
claimed that it violated their rights under the takings clause. In
Phillips, the question before the Court was a narrow one:
whether "interest earned on client trust funds held by lawyers in
JOLTA accounts [is] a property interest of the client or lawyer,
cognizable under the ... Fifth Amendment." 89
The law of Texas, like most states, follows the general rule
that "interest follows the principal." Thus, as a general matter,
interest earned by a client's trust account funds is the property of
the client. The twist in Phillips was that the client funds placed in
IOLTA accounts were placed there because they would-on
their own-generate no net interest. Held in a non-IOLTA account, these funds were too small in amount, and held for too
brief a period, for any interest earned to offset the cost of establishing and maintaining the account, service charges, accounting
costs, and tax reporting costs that the account would generate. In
other words, the placing of these funds in IOLTA accounts deprived the claimants of zero dollars of economic value.
This did not deter the Court. In a 5-4 decision, the Court
held that the claimants nonetheless demonstrated a property interest cognizable under the takings clause. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that "[w]e have never held that
a physical item is not 'propertt simply because it lacks a positive
economic or market value." Indeed, "we [have] held that a
property right was taken even when infringement of that right
arguably increased the market value of the property at issue. "91
Of course, Phillips involved no "physical item" in any traditional
sense; at issue was interest that would not be earned, absent the
challenged statutory scheme. This, however, made no difference.
Although not deprived of property in that sense, the claimants
were deprived of "possession, control, and disposition"- and the
"confiscation" of these rights is an interference with "property"
cognizable under the takings clause.92
If Eastern Enterprises and Phillips are taken together, the
potential scope of "takings" expands enormously. Any law that
upsets expectations, imposes liability on the basis of prior relationships and actions, or disproportionately benefits some to the
detriment of others, is now fair game. In addition, it is not even

89.
90.
91.
92.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 164 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
at 169.
at 170.
at 170, 171.
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necessary that the claimant show economic injury-far more intangible interests, such as "control" over government actions,
are protected as well. Rights under "existing legislation"? Immunities for specific groups, that regulations create? Disproportionate impacts of local laws, or complaints about the use of tax
money? There is no apparent intellectual barrier to "property"
interests in any of these cases, and to resultant takings claims.
As the scope of "property" expands, what the Court finds to
be a "taking" of that property must contract. No complex society
can adhere to a rule that makes it liable for every change in circumstance, disappointment, or frustration that every individual
endures at government hands. Indeed, what the Court granted in
"IOLTA I," it took away five years later. In Brown v. Legal
Foundation of Washington ("IOLTA 11"),93 the Court faced the
question not reached in Phillips: whether the constitutionally
cognizable "property" that the Court had found to be at stake in
Phillips was "taken" by the Washington State IOLTA scheme,
in a way that the Fifth Amendment recognized. 94 The Court held
that it was not. What was the reason? The IOLTA scheme "had
no adverse economic impact on petitioners and did not interfere
with any investment-backed expectation."95 Since "the value of
the petitioners' net loss was zero, the compensation that is due"
was also zero. 96 In short, without economic harm, there will not
be (in the vast run of cases) a Fifth Amendment "taking" or a
"right to compensation". 97

*****
Under the Scalian view of property and takings, property is
the (effectively) limiting concept, with a taking routinely found if
property is impaired. With the specter of "property" interests
created by virtually any statute, court decision, regulation, and
expectation, this approach became untenable. No longer could
the simple Scalian rule realistically provide its simple guarantee.
While the expansionist ideas of property in Eastern Enterprises
and Phillips may have cheered protectionist proponents, those
same ideas worked-inevitably-toward the undermining of
their ideal.

93.

538

u.s. 216 (2003).

See id. at 220.
Id. at 234.
I d. at 237.
97. See id. at 234-40.

94.
95.
96.
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C. THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE

The final and most fundamental reason for the ultimate defeat of the Scalian view of property and takings is found in an
old idea: the need to account for justice in applying the takings
clause.
The conviction that justice is deeply involved in takings
cases has lon~ been articulated by the Court. In Armstrong v.
United States, decided more than forty years ago, the Court famously stated that the takings clause was "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole. "99 Since Armstrong was written, this language has
appeared in virtually every opinion that the Court has issued
construing this clause. 100
The repeated invocation of "justice" and "fairness" in takings opinions, however, generally has been an awkward one. Although justice is presented in these passages as the analytical
lynchpin for these decisions, when the Court's actual reasoning
is examined it seems to be largely an afterthought.
Take, for instance, the Dolan 101 case, which involved a takings challenge to "exactions" demanded by a city in exchange for
the granting of a municipal building permit. In the first paragraph of his analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, repeated the Armstrong language and declared that the
achievement of justice and fairness must guide the resolution of
the case. 102 Yet, in the ensuing and lengthy discussion of the issues involved, neither justice nor fairness is mentioned again. In
holding that the City of Tigard had failed to establish a sufficient
factual basis for its permit conditions, the Court reasoned from
various legal premises that were identified in the opinion. In this
process, neither "justice" nor "fairness" nor its equivalent appears.
This pattern is repeated in case after case. Although the
question of "justice" or "fairness" is continually invoked as the
central inquiry before the Court, it is rarely addressed in any
98. 364 u.s. 40 (1960).
99. I d. at 49.
100. Accord, e.g., Oty of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 6tfl, 702 (1999);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comrn'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
101. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 12 U.S. 374 (1994).
I 02. I d. at 384.
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depth in the discussion that follows. Indeed, when we think of
the mass of the Court's decisions in this field, it is difficult to articulate how "justice" or "fairness" should be evaluated in these
cases. Exactions are demanded by a city as the price for approval
of a development proposal. Is this "just"? Is this "fair"? A developer's plans are thwarted by coastal wetlands regulations. Is
this "just"? Is this "fair"? When we consider the Court's opinions in this field, in the aggregate, there is little guidance on
these issues. All sides claim the importance of justice, because it
"feels right" and taps into our deep instinct that this must be the
vital issue. Yet, after this acknowledgment, the question of "justice" or "fairness" is left unexplored, unexplained.
The reason for this failure to grapple with the question of
justice has been undoubtedly different for different members of
the Court. For those who have adhered to the Scalian view of
takings and property, the meaning of "justice" in this context
was apparently so obvious that it needed no explanation. For
those who have opposed the Scalian view, the understanding of
justice that it entails-although apparently often assumed by
these justices to be correct as well-sat uneasily with the ends
they have wished to reach. As a result, "justice" has been, for
them, something to be simply, quietly, and almost conspiratorially ignored. Rather than rethink the question of justice, they
have simply sidelined it.
What is this Scalian notion of justice, that has been assumed
so powerfully in this context? Let us again consider the Lucas
case. In Lucas, the question was whether a state's prohibition of
development of shorefront land, to preserve the beach/dune system and prevent erosion, was a taking of property without compensation. In his analysis of this question, Justice Scalia discussed how this law brought the landowner's glans "to an abrupt
end," and severely impacted him financially. 1 He discussed how
there might be situations, such as those involving zoning or other
controls, when a complaining landowner gains from the challenged law-but that this was not such a case. He concluded, in
brief, that Lucas should be saddled with such uncompensated
loss only if the restriction should have been "expected" by him
or "part of his title to begin with." 104 If neither was true, compensation would be owed.

103. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 100&-10 (1992).
104. ld. at 1027.
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What is most striking about this view of justice in takings is
its completely one-sided character. Although the interests of the
property owner are scrupulously considered, there is no consideration of the interests of the state, or of those whom it represents.
Indeed, it is fair to conclude that under the Scalian view,
consideration of asserted public interests in the broad run of takings cases is not simply ignored- it is, in fact, illegitimate. In his
concurrence in Palazzolo, for instance, Justice Scalia described
the value that accrues to the public through wetlands preservation laws as "profit to the thief" 105 A thief is, of course, someone
who has- by definition- no legitimate interest to assert. In this
view, we do not have parties with legitimate, dueling interests;
we have one party with legitimate interests, and the other party
with none.
This view of the interests at stake is remarkable when we
remember that the question of justice or fairness in law-on
which takings cases are purported to depend-is an inherently
relational inquiry. When we decide whether a law or its operation is "just," this is an inquiry about the advantages and disadvantages that "x" derives from the operation of that law, or its
absence-and the advantages and disadvantages that are suffered by "y". Indeed, when considering "justice" in law, we cannot evaluate the claim of one party without reference to the
other. Yet that is precisely what the Scalian view of justice in
takings demands. It demands that we imagine the interests of
one party-the takings claimant-and not the interests of the
other.
The reason for the single focus of the Scalian view is its assumed, prior beliefs about the nature of the individual's claimed
right and of the competing public interest. The Scalian view sees
the individual landowner as a project pursuer, with a right to act,
who is wronged by government action. Because the government
"transgresses the side constraints constituted by [the individual's] rights," it becomes the individual's moral debtor. 106 The
government must pay for the owner's loss. It is a question of
compensatory justice.
Public interests are eclipsed, in this view, because of its
foundational assumption that the claimant is the victim, and the
105. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,637 (2001) (emphasis added).
106. See Loren E. Lomasky, Compensation and the Bounds of Rights, in NOMOS
XXXIII: COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 13,24-26 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991).
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government the aggressor. With the moral stakes thus drawn, the
"justice" question is simple. It is how to rectify this wrong-not
whether there is a wrong, in light of the merits of (or need for)
the opposing public action.
For those cases decided during the 1990s, when the Scalian
view reigned, this view of justice was plausible. In this era, the
typical case before the Court juxtaposed significant injury to
property owners with relatively trivial public interests. For instance, the local land-use concerns in Nollan, Dolan, and City of
Monterey (such as ocean viewing, drainage concerns, vegetation
concerns, and so on) were not of a kind that demanded a public
dimension to "justice." Even Lucas, with its shoreline concerns,
had little public impact by virtue of the "rare" facts presented.
Seldom will a completely buildable lot be rendered "worthless,"
as the result of government regulation. 107
If this view of the competing interests at stake was plausible
in all of these cases, it was not in Palazzolo and Tahoe. The simple story in which the landowner is the "victim" and the public
the "aggressor" is unconvincing when individual actions destroy
thousands of acres of wetlands, or threaten a resource as valued
as Lake Tahoe. In these cases, the loss of individual landowners'
"rights" was viewed against the backdrop of a tremendous public
loss if the Court were to adhere to the Scalian vision. Public interests could no longer be ignored- and the simple scheme of
"compensatory" justice for "victims" of government action became suddenly and patently inadequate.
In Palazzolo, the Court's majority hinted at the need for a
more contextual and balanced approach to the ultimate takings
question, which would include the consideration of public interests.108 In Tahoe, this change in focus was explicit. We are concerned, Justice Stevens wrote, with a lake that is "uni~ely beautiful, ... a national treasure that must be protected." 1 Individual
landowners' development actions, however, threatened the lake's
pristine state and exceptional clarity. 110 '"[U]nless the process [of
degradation] is stopped, the lake will lose its clarity and its
trademark blue color, becoming green and opaque for all eternity."'tt I
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627, 630; supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
109. Tahoe v. Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. /d.
111. /d. at 308 (quoting the district ccart's opinion).
107.

I 08.
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Against the magnitude and gravity of this potential loss, interference with the complaining landowners' claimed right to
build rapidly paled in comparison. The "ultimate constitutional
question," Justice Stevens wrote, "is whether the concepts of
'fairness and justice' that underlie the Takings Clause" will be
better served by a per se compensatory rule, or by a "'careful examination and weighing of all of the relevant circumstances."' 112
Building moratoria such as that imposed in the Tahoe case are
used widely by land-use planners to preserve the status quo
while they formulate a more permanent development strategy. 113
"The interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking by [such]
regulatory agencies counsels against adopting a per se rule that
would impose ... severe costs on their deliberations." 114 Rather
than assume that a compensatory obligation by government exists, we should use a careful, contextual, ad hoc approach in such
cases. 115
The shift toward an idea that justice requires consideration
of competing interests and competing claims is apparent
throughout Justice Stevens's opinion. Although interference
with a property owner's investment-backed expectations must be
considered, it "'is Jonly] one of a number of factors that a court
must examine."' 11 Competing with the interests of the complaining landowners in the Tahoe case are other public and private interests that depend upon the lake's preservation. All of
these interests must be considered if "justice and fairness"- the
bottom-line inquiries-are to be achieved in regulatory takings
cases. 117
The extent to which the majority veered from the Scallan
path was not lost on the dissenters. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
whom Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, argued that the case
must be viewed "[f]rom the [complaining owners'] ... stand118
•
"
s·mce va1ue was tak en from the owners Wit· h no return,
pomt.
the case required compensation. Indeed, the dissenters' assumption that the landowners' loss-and only the landowners' lossshould be considered in such cases is graphically illustrated by
the physical structure of the Chief Justice's opinion. In a para112.
ring)).
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

/d. at 334, 326 n. 23 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concur/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 337-38.
at 339.
at 339-42.
at 326 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
at 334-35.
/d. at 349 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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graph at the very end of his opinion, set apart from the rest by
three asterisks, he acknowledged that "Lake Tahoe is a national
treasure(,] and I do not doubt that respondent's efforts at preventing further degradation of the lake were made in good faith
in furtherance of the public interest." 119 However, these "efforts," as the physical and symbolic separation of their description attests, are simply an afterthought. They are a touching
story, perhaps- but of no palpable legal interest.
To ignore the bilateral nature of justice in property cases is,
in truth, the very deepest of ironies. Land-use disputes, of the
kind that Tahoe, Palazzolo, Lucas, and like cases present, involve competing property interests. 120 What these cases really involve is the pitting of the interests of the complaining landowners to develop their land against the property interests of other
shoreline owners and users. It is difficult to see why the property
interests of some should be exalted, and the same interests of
others ignored, in a searching assessment of "justice."
Indeed, more than other claims that are constitutionally
based, property claims are so often-by their very natureunavoidably reciprocal in character. Freedom of speech, due
process of law, freedom of religion, and other basic rights arein a sense- "public goods," which can (in theory, at least) be enjoyed equally and freely by all, without cost to or deprivation of
some by others. The character of property claims to physical, finite, nonshareable resources is necessarily the opposite. The
claim of the takings claimant to unfettered control of land, chattels, or other resources necessarily and inevitably denies the
same claims to control asserted, through government, by others.
In this situation, we do not have a simple "evil" done by government to the takings claimant: we have reciprocal "evils,"
done by reciprocal actors.
By simultaneously stressing the importance of justice in takings and attempting to restrict its scope, the Scalian view is an
inherently unstable concoction. It forces us to imagine justice, in
takings, as half of the whole-the sound of one hand clapping.

119. I d. at 354.
120. See UNDERKOFFLER. supra note 13, at 94-102, 123-24 (describing how
claimed property rights and competing public interests in cases of this type are grounded
in very similar property·based interests and values).
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IV. CONCLUSION
With the decision in Lucas in 1992 and for almost ten years
thereafter, the Scalian view of property and its protection dominated Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. Under this vision,
property provides a concrete, objectively knowable, and immutable legal barrier which marks the line between protected individual interests and the exercise of collective power. If government transgresses this line, the individual is almost always
deemed to have been wronged. And compensation is required,
as a matter of "compensatory" justice, under the takings clause.
In the past few years, the hegemony enjoyed by this view
has crumbled. After Palazzolo and Tahoe, no longer will the
idea of property-itself-mark, with certainty, where protected
individual interests end and collective power begins. No longer
will the fact of individual loss, even significant individual loss,
necessarily compel the conclusion that a wrong has occurred, or
drive an award of compensation home. We must, instead, view
individual losses in these cases in the social, economic, and political contexts in which they occur. We must "weigh all of the
relevant circumstances." We must make ad hoc, normative
judgments. We must consider how all affected persons should
share the "benefits and burdens of economic life."
The confidence with which I have declared the death of the
Scalian view of takings is rooted less in a conviction about the
constancy of Supreme Court jurisprudence, than in the contention that the ideas that form the core of the Scalian view doomed
it from the start as a viable juridical principle. Its idea of property as a concrete, pre-political, self-defining concept was inevitably exposed as mythical. Its expansion-as "concretely" understood- to encompass virtually any reliance interest created
by law inevitably proved to be impractical. And, as public costs
loomed, its eclipse of public interests in the takings calculation
could not, in the end, be reconciled with the idea of justice for all
parties.
The Scalian view of property and its function is, of course,
not a completely fanciful or improbable one. Indeed, it can be
seen, at its core, as a attempt to articulate a vision of property
that all of us, on some level, share. The idea of property rights as
fixed, unyielding, bounded, and protected responds to the deep
insecurity that individuals feel in the face of the constant threat
posed by collective power. If we are honest, we must admit that
each of us believes in this idea for some objects, for some claims,
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for some assurance that our own psychological needs will be respected and our own acquisitive efforts rewarded. The Scalian
view's bold attempt to guarantee the vindication of this idea has
powerful appeal. Its assertion that the "takings" guarantee is
simply an extension of this function seems, superficially at least,
to be a natural one.
The problem arises when this vision of property is presented as the sole and motivating idea for resolving takings issues. Had the scope of American takings law remained what it
was in the pre-Mahon 121 era-had it remained concerned with
"physical," as opposed to "regulatory" takings-the seeming
equivalence of the idea of property and the outer boundaries of
the permissible exercise of government power might have remained unquestioned. If, for instance, we limited the scope of
takings questions to the takings of title by government, or to
physical occupation of land by government, the cases would be
simple enough, and our notions of protected interests in these
cases would be strong enough, that the conclusion that the idea
of property "resolves" these takings issues would (coincidentally) be true.
But American takings law has not remained so limited. Instead, it has expanded to include regulatory takings, "intangibles" takings, takings of every conceivable form and fashion.
This expansion has defeated the simple equivalence of preconceived notions of property and the permissible scope of government power. In these cases, we have no concrete, ready-made
notions of property upon which to rely. Indeed, the idea of
property as a concrete, fixed, and bounded entity cannot, by
definition, be congruent with the idea of property as a potentially unlimited field of individual reliance interests. As notions
of "property" and "takings" expand, we must concede that we
cannot resolve these claims without considering the competing
claims of others.
In a way, one might say, the Scalian view wanted too much.
It wanted to maintain the image of property as clear, preordained, fixed, and bounded. It wanted to extend this image to
ever more far-flung and intangible legal interests. And when, as
a result of this enterprise, conflicts with other (public) interests
mounted, it claimed exemption from a balancing of interests. Although appealing in simple contexts, the Scalian view is, in the
end, practically, legally, and philosophically impossible.
121.

See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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The idea of property rights as fixed, unyielding, bounded,
and protected is an emotionally important one for each of us.
However, the gulf between this vision of property rights and
their necessary institutional contingency is profound. Property's
function, as a social and political institution, is the resolution of
conflicting needs, visions, values, and histories. If we refuse to
question the premise that the idea of property is, itself, determinative of these conflicts-if we refuse to acknowledge the complex, interrelated, and allocative nature of property conflictswe will fail to account for the true costs of our actions, individually and collectively. We will fail to intelligently confront our
choices. And we will fail to vindicate the ideal of justice, which
takings jurisprudence has so stubbornly retained.

